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Writs of Prohibition and Ecclesiastical
Sanctions in the English Courts Christian
R.H. Helmholz*
In medieval England the writ of prohibition, ancestor of the
modern writ used to restrain an inferior court from exceeding
its jurisdiction,1 was most commonly used to restrain the courts
of the Church, which administered the great body of canon law
and stood independent of the jurisdiction of the King.2 Prohibitions, normally issued on application to Chancery or the King's
Bench, lay where the subject matter of the suit belonged to the
"crown and dignity" of the King rather than to the jurisdiction
3
of the spiritual courts.
The writ was necessary because the medieval Church held
a wider view of its sphere of subject matter jurisdiction than the
King's government would allow. For example, the right to enforce contracts formalized by means of an oath was claimed by
the English Church courts.4 The English common law lawyers
denied the claim.5 They contended that unless the contract re* Professor of Law and History, Washington University. The author would like to thank Professor Jules B. Gerard for his helpful comments.
1. See generally F. FERIs, THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REiEDiES §§ 303-41 (1926); J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON ExTRAoRDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES §§ 762-804 (2d ed. 1884); J. SHORTT, INFORMATIONS (CRMVaNAL
AND QUO WARRANTO) MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION *426-98; Hughes &
Brown, The Writ of Prohibition, 26 GEo. L.J. 831 (1938); Smith, The
PrerogativeWrits, 11 CAMB. L.J. 40 (1951). There are also several recent

and useful articles on the writ in particular American jurisdictions.
Boone, Prohibition: Use of the Writ of Restraint in California,15 HASTiNaS L.J. 161 (1963); Bosson & Sanders, The Writ of Prohibition in New
Mexico, 5 N.M.L. REv. 91 (1974); Simko, Mandamus and Prohibition in
Idaho, 4 IDAHO L. REV. 5 (1967); Note, The Writ of Prohibitionin Missouri,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 511.
2. The most recent writer on English ecclesiastical law takes the

position that the modern Church courts retain their independence and
are "neither inferior nor superior" to the secular royal courts. E. MOORE,
AN INTRODUCTION

TO ENGLISH CANON LAW

125-26 (1967).

3. "[Aid coronam et dignitatem nostram." See, e.g., H. BRACTON,
DE LEGIBUS Er CONSUETuDINIBUS ANGLAx, f. 402 (G. Woodbine ed. 191542) [hereinafter cited as H. BRACTON].

4. See Esmein, Le serment promissoire dans le droit canonique, 12
3d ser. 248 (1888);
Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 L.Q. REv. 406 (1975).
5. See Constitutions of Clarendon, chs. 1, 15, in STUsBS' SELECT
REVUE IIISTORIQUE DE DRorr FRANcAis Er ETRANGER,
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lated to marriage or testaments, the ecclesiastical courts were
without jurisdiction. They further insisted that those courts
must not deal with lay contracts indirectly, by considering what
amounted to a secular cause of action under a spiritual name. 6
Thus, while they admitted that the canon law could punish a
man for perjury, they maintained that it had no jurisdiction to
compel a man to comply with a simple contract he had sworn
to fulfil. If the ecclesiastical court judges heard such suits, they
and the party suing could be prohibited from continuing the suit,
on complaint of the party aggrieved. And those who violated
the writ of prohibition would suffer for it; they would be liable
to imprisonment, fine, and (though this seems not to have been
available in the earliest days) to damages in favor of the injured
party.7 The writ of prohibition was thus used to determine, and
to enforce, the royal view of the proper boundary between the
jurisdiction of royal and ecclesiastical courts.
Forty years ago, Professor Norma Adams published an article
in this Review, entitled The Writ of Prohibitionto Court Christian.8 Professor Adams's article has stood up well in the intervening years, and its conclusions have been widely accepted. It
has continued to be used and cited, 9 together with Flahiff's subseCHARTERS 164, 167 (9th ed. H. Davis 1921); Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian, 20 MINN. L. REv. 272, 276 (1936) [hereinafter
cited as Adams].
6. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 201 (2d ed., reissued 1968). English canonists, on the other hand,
suggest that such a purely formal variation in the remedy demanded was
effective in practice to give the ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction. See
William of Drogheda, Summa Aurea, in 2 QUELLEN ZUR GEscmcHTE DES
Ro mvsc-KANoNiscHEN PROZESsEs nw MITTELATER 65, 67 (L. Wahrmund
ed. 1913, reprint 1962); W. LYNDWOOD, PROVINcALE (SEu CoNsTiTUTvONEs
ANGLIAE) 315 s.v. perjurio (1679). See also 3 RoTurLi PARLIAMENTORUM
645-46 (no. 72 1410) [hereinafter cited as W. LYNnWOOD].
7. Adams, supra note 6, at 286.
8. Adams, supra note 6.
9. E.g., S. Chrimes, Introductory Essay, in 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 66 n.8 (1966); F. LOGAN, EXCOmMUNICATION AND
THE SECULAR ARmi IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 88 n.93 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as F. LOGAN]; S.F.C. Milsom, Legal Introduction, in NOVAE NARRATIONES
cxcviii (80 Seldon Society 1963) [hereinafter cited as Milsom]; T.F.T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Commox LAW 395 n.1 (5th ed.

1956);

J. SAYERS, PAPAL JUDGES DELEGATE IN THE PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY

1198-254, 165 n.3 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as J. SAYERS]; Dobbs, The

Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REV. 49, 51 n.9

(1961);

Donahue, Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs
vs. Maitland Reexamined After 75 Years in the Light of Some Records
from the Church Courts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 647, 660 n.64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Donahue].

1976]

WRITS AND SANCTIONS

1013

quent and more extensive treatment. 10 However, an important
aspect of the topic was not covered by Professor Adams's article,
nor have other commentators dealt with it. This aspect is the
receipt of the writ by the courts Christian and their treatment
of cases involving conflicting claims to jurisdiction. We know,
it is true, that the bishops complained bitterly about the hardships caused to their courts by what they claimed was excessive
use of prohibitions. Their petitions for change in the system
were frequent." But medieval petitions lent themselves to exaggeration. Their object was redress of a grievance, not balanced
presentation of fact. A better, though not infallible, guide is provided by regularly compiled court records. And here Professor
Adams's article, like virtually all treatments of the subject, was
based exclusively on royal records. 12 Hence we know much more
about the procedure for issuing writs of prohibition than we
know about how the ecclesiastical courts reacted to them. Our
knowledge of the working and effectiveness of prohibitions is
based on the records of the side that issued them, not on those
of the side that received them. For understanding the realities
of legal relations between Church and State in pre-Reformation
England, the testimony of both royal and ecclesiastical courts is
equally important.' 3
The present article therefore treats writs of prohibition from
the perspective of the reactions of the ecclesiastical courts.
It is based on examination of most of the surviving records of
England's ecclesiastical courts for the period prior to the Reformation. 14 Unfortunately, only a small portion of these records
10.

Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibitionto Court Christianin the Thir-

teenth Century (pts. 1 & 2), 6 MEDIEWvL STUDIES 261 (1944) and 7 MEDIEVAL STUDIES 229 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Flahiff].

11. A comprehensive review is provided by Jones, Bishops, Politics,
and the Two Laws: The Gravamina of the English Clergy, 1237-1399,
41 SPECULUM 209 (1966). See also D. DOuiE, ARcHIsuoP PECHAM 11322 (1952).
12. The two exceptions known to me are B. WooDcocx, MEDIEVAL
ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CANTERBURY 108 (1952) [hereinafter cited as B. WooDcocK] and Donahue, supra note 9, at 665.
13. This point is made clearly and at greater length in G. ELTON,

1200-1640, at 114-15 (1969). For a general survey of the current
state of knowledge, see Jones, Relations of the Two Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation in England During the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
ENGLAND,

Centuries, 7 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAissANcE HIsTORY 79 (W.

Bowsky ed. 1970).
14. For a summary description of the records and a description of
the various types of courts, see D. OwEN, THE RECORDS OF THE ESTAB-

(1970). A
good example and a description of the records kept by the courts is found

LISHED CHURCH IN ENGLAND EXCLUDING PAROCHIAL RECORDS
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has survived, much fewer than the number of the royal courts'
records. There are enough, however, to yield a significant sample. There are enough examples of prohibitions received and of
cases in which the Church dealt with questions of conflicting
jurisdiction to give some confidence in their representativeness,
even if they constitute only a statistically small part of the total
number of instances which must actually have occurred. Their
study fills out the history of the writ of prohibition and sheds
some new light on the history of legal relations between Church
and State.
I. RECEIPT OF ROYAL WRITS
For purposes of studying receipt of the writ, only cases in
which the Church court records show a prohibition introduced
into actual litigation are included. I have excluded secondhand sources. For example, records of attachment on prohibitions from the plea rolls of the royal courts are not used. They
invariably suggest disobedience to the royal writ.15 This, however, was a necessary part of the allegations, without which the
plaintiff could not have brought the action at all. It does not
prove actual disobedience. Also excluded are depositions from
the Church court records 6 and royal writs copied into formuin Donahue & Gordus, A Case from Archbishop Stratford's Audience Act
Book and Some Comments on the Book and Its Value, 2 BULL. MEDIEVAL
CANON L. 45 (1972).
Citations to manuscript Church court records are
given hereinafter by diocese, rather than by present record repository.
The diocesan court records used, with corresponding repositories, are as
follows:
Canterbury
Library of the Dean and Chapter, Canterbury,
and Lambeth Palace Library, London [Act
book MS. 244].
Chichester
West Sussex Record Office, Chichester.
Ely
Cambridge University Library.
Exeter
Devon Record Office, Exeter.
Hereford
Hereford County Record Office, Hereford.
Lichfield
Joint Record Office, Lichfield.
London
Guildhall Library, London [MS. 9064 records]
and Greater London Council Record Office
[DL/C records].
Norwich
Norfolk Record Office, Norwich.
Rochester
Kent County Record Office, Maidstone.
York
Borthwick Institute of Historical Research
[Cause Papers and A B Act Books] and
York Minster Library [M 2 (1) Act Books].
15. In an attachment on a writ of prohibition, it was normally alleged that one party delivered the prohibition, but that the other, "spreta
regia prohibicione predicta nichilominus placitum illud ulterius secutus
fuit." E.g., Public Record Office, London [hereinafter cited as P.R.O.]
C.P. 40/330, m. 275d (1342).
16. In a case heard in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Court of
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laries or bishops' registers. 17 Some examples found among this
excluded evidence have the ring of truth about them.' 8 But too
many are mere ex parte statements that we cannot verify. Rather
than attempt, after centuries have passed, to sort out the reliable
from the exaggerated, it seems safer to deal only with receipts
of a writ in cases recorded in the regular course of Church court
business. The scribe who compiled the court records had no reason to distort the truth. The canon law required that he make
a true record.' 9 He had nothing to gain by distortion or concealment of the facts.
Under this criterion, Church court records produce 52 cases
of royal prohibitions received. They range in date from 1293 to
1501. The largest number come from the courts of two archiepiscopal sees, Canterbury and York. There are 23 cases from the
former, 20 14 from the latter.21 Six other dioceses are also repre23
22
sented, however: Lichfield with seven; Hereford with three;
Audience and recorded in Canterbury Act book Chartae Antiquae A 36
IV, f. i5v (1340), for example, a witness testified that in a previous case
in the same court, the archbishop had delayed the hearing after receipt
of a prohibition until he could obtain a writ of consultation allowing the
original case to proceed. Since I have been unable to trace the case referred to, I have not counted this instance.
17. Most bishop's registers contain one or more writs of prohibition,
but not as a part of records of litigation. See 1 I. CuRcHmL, CANTRBURY ADMNImSTRATION 528-34 (1933).
18. E.g., 3 BAcToN's NOTE BOOK, no. 1388 (1220) (F. Maitland
ed. 1887), a case in which the defendant admitted continuing the case
after receipt of a writ of prohibition, acting on the advice of the papal
legate.
19. Decretales Gregorii IX, c. Quonian contra falsam (X 2.19.11),
found in 2 CoRpus JuRIs CANoNIcI, col. 313 (A. Friedberg ed. 1879). For
a comment by a medieval canonist on the notary's duty, see, for example,
HOSTIENsIS, LECTuRA IN LIBRoS DECRETALITJm, lib. 3, tit. ne cler. vel. mon.,
ch. 8 (Sicut te accepimus) no. 4 (Venice 1581, f. 181A): "Primo, quod
de his quae videbit et audiet et requisitus fuerit sine diminutione veritatis
et commixtione falsitatis conficiet instrumentum."
20. Ecclesiatical Suit no. 54 (1293); Act book Lambeth Palace MS.
244, f.4 (1304); f.21r (1304); f.25r (1304); f.62r (1305); f.68v (1305);
f.79r (1306); f.93v (1308); f.95r (1309); f.96r (1309); f.101r (1309);
Canterbury Act books Chartae Antiquae II, f. 31r (1329); Chartae
Antiquae IV, f. 34r (1340); Y.1.1, f. 40r (1373), f. 73v (1374), f. 75v
(1374); Y.1.2, f.27v (1397), f.31r (1397), f.117r (1398); Y.1.3, f.42r
(1418); Y.1.7, f. 156r (1463); Y.1.6, f. 205v (1467); Y.1.13, f. 378v (1483).
21. C[ausel P[apers] E 39 (1339), E 72 (1356), E 172 (1365); Act
books M 2(1) b, f. 7r (1371), f. 9v (1371); M 2(1) c, f. 2v (1371), f. 3v
(1371), f.25v (1374); C.P. E 250 1383), E 141 (1385), E 217 (1395);
Reg. Bowet I, f. 307r (1411); Act books Cons. A B 1, f. 65r (1418); A
B 2,f.56r (1425).
22. Act book B/C/l/l, f. 60v (1465), f. 161v (1467), f. 222v (1468):
f. 252v (1469); B/C/1/2, f. 185r (1475), f. 259v (1476), f. 290r (1477).
23. Act books Il, 204 (1495), 1/2, 17 (1497), 54 (1498).
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Rochester with two;2 4 and London, 25 Ely,2 6 and Bath and Wells 27
with one apiece. These ecclesiastical cases can be broken down
by subject matter as follows:
Testamentary
16
Breach of Faith
6
Ecclesiastical Dues
6
Tithe
4
Defamation
4
Annual Pension
4
Spoliation of Benefice
1
Usury
1
10
Uncertain or Not Stated
The number of recorded cases is too small to be conclusive
evidence concerning the areas actually in dispute. But, even admitting this, the relatively large number of testamentary causes
is noteworthy. It is not surprising. The right of the executor
to collect debts owed to the decedent and the right of the decedent's creditors to enforce their claims against the estate were,
in the ecclesiastical view, a proper part of probate administration.28 The Church courts were, therefore, open to suits between
executors and debtors and between creditors and executors. Efficient administration required it. The royal courts viewed this
as ecclesiastical encroachment on their jurisdiction. The executor should be no better off than the testator would have been
himself. The testator, for most obligations, could only have sued
at common law.29 Therefore a prohibition lay to restrain the
A.D. 1319-1353,
(C. Johnson ed. 48 & 49 Canterbury and York Society
1948) [hereinafter cited as REGISTRUM HAMONIS HETHE]; Act book DRb
Pa 1, f. 133r (1440).
25. Act book DL/C/1, f. 994 (1501).
26. Act book EDR D/2/1, f. 86v (1378).
27. Act book D/D/C Al, 228, 230 (1461).
28. See, e.g., CouNcILs AND SYNODS wiTH OTHER Docu ENTs RELATING TO THE ENGLISH CHURCH II, A.D. 1205-1313, at 958, 961 (F. Powicke
& C. Cheney eds. 1964) [hereinafter cited as COUNCILS AND SYNODS];
Flahiff (pt. 1), supra note 10, at 277-79; Jones, supra note 13, 169-78.
An example from the Church court records of suit brought by an executor is found in Chichester Act book Ep I/10/1, f. 43v (1508): the executor William Coklyn sued Thomas Gylly for 20 measures of barley,
"quos debuit dicto defuncto."
29. COUNCILS AND SYNODS, supra note 28, at 875-77; ST. GERMAN'S
DOCTOR AND STUDENT 232 (T. Plucknett & J. Barton eds. 91 Selden Society 1974). The remedies available at common law and the position taken
as to the scope of the writ of prohibition in testamentary cases are slightly more complicated. For fuller accounts, see J. BARTON, RomAN LAW IN
ENGLAND 80-93 (Ius Romanum Medii Aevi V, 13a, 1971); R. GoFim, THE
24.

REcIsmum HAMONIS HETHE, DIoCEsIs ROFFENSIS,

at 943 (1347)

TESTAMENTARY

EXECUTOR IN

ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE

37-57 (1901); Mc-

Govern, Contract in Medieval England: Wager of Law and the Effect
of Death, 54 IowA L. REV. 19, 38-48 (1968).
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Church courts from giving the executor (or the creditor of the
testator) a right that would not have existed had the testator
been alive, namely the right to sue in a Church court. The persistence of the Church courts in maintaining their claim throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, together with the substantial amounts of money which must have been at issue in
these cases, helps to explain the preponderance of prohibited testamentary causes. 30 We can only wonder that there were not
more.
Equally noteworthy, but in the opposite way, is the small
number of cases relating to ecclesiastical patronage. The right
to present a cleric to the bishop for induction into a benefice was
a valuable right in the Middle Ages. 31 Both canon law and royal
law claimed the right to try disputes over it. To the Church it
was a spiritual matter, heard under the heading of jus patronatus. To the King's court, on the other hand, the advowson, or
right to present, was a lay possession. In no area of the law was
the theoretical conflict between claims of the canon law and English law clearer,32 but the number of cases relating to ecclesiastical benefices is very small in the remaining Church court
records. Most of those did not encroach directly on the royal
right to try all claims relating to advowsons.33 Historians
have generally concluded that the Church tacitly acquiesced in
the royal claims to try questions of patronage in later medieval
England. 34 The court records involving prohibitions do not contradict this conclusion.
30. Note, however, that the Church claimed jurisdiction by English
custom, not because the subject matter was inherently spiritual; see W.
LYNDWOOD, supra note 6, at 170 s.v. insinuationem. The English Act
books also contain occasional testamentary causes remitted to secular
tribunals by the Church court judges themselves; e.g., Hereford Act book
1/4, 122 (1511): "In causa testamentaria, ... , iudex licenciavit eosdem
ire ad consilium principis et sic partes dimisse [sunt] ;" Rochester Act
book DRb Pa 1, f. 87v (1438): "Remittitur iuri communi;" 4 REGISTERS
Or ROGER MARTIVAL, BISHOP OF SALIsBURY 1315-1330, at 66-67 (K. Edwards
&D. Owen eds. 141 Canterbury & York Society 1973-4).
31. 2 F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 136-40.
32. Gray, The is praesentandi in England from the Constitutions
of Clarendon to Bracton, 67 ENG. HISTORICAL REv. 481 (1952).
33. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 661-63; O'Day, The Law of Patronage in Early Modern England, 26 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY 274
(1975); Plucknett, Execrabilis in the Common Pleas: Further Studies,
1 CAMB. L.J. 60 (1921).
34. See, e.g., W. PANTIN, THE ENGLISH CHuRcH IN THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY 86 (1962). The statistics supplied by Flahiff (pt. 1), supra note

10, at 310, are also illuminating. An excellent example of the attitude
of an English bishop caught between royal and papal claims in matters

1018

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:i1011

The writ of prohibition was introduced at various stages of
the proceedings in the Church courts, from immediately after the
first appearance by the parties, 35 to after definitive sentence by
the judge.30 When it came seems to have made no difference.
This is what English common law would lead one to expect.
Since a writ of prohibition was meant to protect the King's interest in his jurisdiction, the claim could not be waived by private
parties.3 7 They could not validly renounce their right to use the
writ. They could not acquiesce in ecclesiastical jurisdiction if the
subject matter of the quarrel belonged to royal jurisdiction.
Therefore it would have made no difference at what stage of the
suit in the Church court the prohibition was produced, and this
is what one finds in the Church court records. In fact, we may
say that the point of introduction seems dictated by the convenience of the party producing it, and that it had no apparent
effect on the way the prohibition was received in the Church
courts.
Two other general and useful conclusions can be drawn from
this evidence by the legal historian. The first and most evident
is the infrequency with which proceedings in the English courts
Christian were interrupted by writs of prohibition. The Church
courts apparently enforced the canon law unfettered by more
than a very occasional prohibition. No precise figure for the total number of cases examined in all diocesan courts can be given.
But it runs into several thousands. A total of 52 prohibited cases
is a minute percentage of the total. To take a specific example,
of the 102 cases heard in the diocesan court at Lichfield in 1476
only one was prohibited. 3 Of the slightly fewer than 300 cases
recorded in the first court book from Bath and Wells, only one
was subject to a recorded writ of prohibition. 9 Many, in fact
most, of the remaining court Act books contain no recorded prohibitions at all. 40 The great legal historian F.W. Maitland described writs of prohibition as "always buzzing about the ears
of the patronage of ecclesiastical benefices is found in 10 REGISTRUM
ROBERT WINCHELSEY 1044-46 (R. Graham ed. 114 Canterbury & York Society 1942).
35. E.g., Canterbury Act Book, Y.1.1, f. 31r (1397).
36. E.g., York, C.P. E 72 (1356).
37. H. BRACTON, supra note 3, at f. 401b. See also Adams, supra
note 5, at 283. But cf. Dobbs, supra note 9.
38. Act book B/C/i/i; the prohibited case is at f. 259v.
39. See Dunning, The Wells Consistory Court in the Fifteenth
Century, in 106

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

SOMERSETSHIRE

ARCHAELOGICAL

supra.
40. See generally B. WOODCOCK,supra note 12, at 108.

NATURAL HISTORY SOCIETY 46, 55 (1962); note 27

&

1976]

WRITS AND SANCTIONS

1019

of the ecclesiastical judges. '41 This description seems exaggerated.
It is certainly true, however, that not all writs of prohibition
that were issued would find their way into the Church court records surveyed here. The writ did not have to be delivered in
court to be effective. 4 2 It might be handed over to the judge
and the opposing litigant out of court. And even if it were delivered in open court, we cannot be sure that the prohibition
would have been mentioned specifically in the records. We may
have, therefore, only a small sample of the total number of prohibitions actually used. On the other hand, there was no good
reason for the scribe in the Church court to have omitted notation of the receipt of a prohibition. The fact that sometimes the
introduction of the writ was recorded, coupled with the sheer
volume of cases which were subject to being prohibited but
which were in fact heard in the Church courts, does suggest
strongly that writs of prohibition to the ecclesiastical courts were
not frequently used. If this is so, the importance of prohibitions
in daily practice was less than has been assumed.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the cases of receipt
of prohibitions, to some extent inconsistent with the first, is that
although there may not have been many prohibitions received
and recorded, they were effective when used. When the writs
were introduced, they were obeyed. Of the 52 cases noted above,
not one was continued in the Act book after receipt of the prohibition. The case thereafter disappeared from the records. The
court scribe made no entry in the case after introduction of the
writ. Sometimes he made a marginal note-prohibitum est 43 or
prohibitio 44 -to indicate the receipt of the writ. Other times he
indicated the fact by a similar note in his record of the substance
of the case. 46 In either situation, the following sessions of the
court did not take up the prohibited case. It was dropped.
In a few of these 52 cases, the scribe made more than a summary record of the action taken by the judge in response to the
prohibition. That action was never disobedience to the royal
41. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 200.
42. At least in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, however, it had in fact to be delivered somewhere. See Milsom, supra note

9, at cc. For a printed case in which the place of delivery was different

from the ecclesiastical consistory, see Clerbek v. Lincoln, 26 Selden Society 98 (1301).
43. E.g., Lichfield Act book B/C/l/l, f. 60v (1465).
44. E.g., Canterbury Act book Lambeth MS. 244, f. 21r (1304).
45. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 9, at 669-70.
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writ. For example, at Hereford in 1498, the scribe noted in one
such instance that "the judge, having read the prohibition, desisted in the cause. '46 In a tithe case heard at Canterbury in
1373, when the judge received a writ of prohibition, he "declared
that he was unwilling to proceed in the cause. '47 The judge of
the diocesan court of Bath and Wells received a royal prohibition
in a suit heard in 1461; the court scribe noted that the judge "was
'48
willing to comply with it in every particular.
The ecclesiastical attitude towards the royal writs is particularly revealed by a case heard in 1306 before the Archbishop
of Canterbury's Court of Audience. There were several defendants in the case. Some, but not all, of them delivered a writ
of prohibition to the judge. He desisted as to those in whose
name the prohibition ran. He proceeded as to the rest.49 The
judge would not extend the coverage of the writ of prohibition
to all the defendants. But he would not violate it. The closest
any of the 52 cases comes to suggesting disobedience to the royal
writ is one from 1418 in which the record notes that one party
delivered the writ. The court took no formal action against the
defendant after he had delivered the writ, but the scribe noted
that "nevertheless before his departure a compromise was
reached."50 Other than this, all the recorded writs were apparently effective.
One of the possible reasons that the writs of prohibition were
so uniformly obeyed is that there was an avenue of redress for
their misuse under English common law. If the prohibition had
been wrongly obtained, the plaintiff in the court Christian could
46. Act book 1/2, 54: 'Dicta pars rea inhibuit iudici et exhibuit
quandam prohibicionem impetratam a skaccario domini regis. Et iudex
lecta prohibicione cessavit in causa." A similar entry in a prohibited
case heard after the Act of Supremacy in 1535 is slightly, but not greatly,
different.. Act book I/6, 67 (1536): ". . . breve regium nobis prius exhibitum et transmissum, ob culus reverenciam dicto breve prius perlecto
iudex distulit et supersedebat."
47. Act book Y.1.1, f. 40r: the defendant, "porrexit unam regiam
prohibicionem propter quam commissarius predictus protestabatur se
nolle ulterius procedere in causa."
48. Act book D/D/C Al, 228: "Quo die adveniente prefatus dominus officialis recepit regiam prohibicionem pro eadem causa cui parere in
omnibus voluit ut asseruit."
49. Act book Lambeth MS. 244, f. 79r: 'Et demum quadam prohibicione pro Waltero Kough et Johanne filio et executore Walteri Kough
in iudicio porrecto, unde decretum est quod supersedeatur in negocio
memorato quo ad personas prenominatas et prefigimus allis partibus
terminum ad faciendum super excepcione proposita quod erit iustum."
50. Act book Y.1.3, f. 42r: "Ricardus Leek de parochia de Petham
porrexit domino commissario unam prohibicionem in quadam causa
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obtain a writ of consultation.r' Upon application to the royal
courts, and upon a showing that the true nature of the dispute
was within ecclesiastical cognizance, the aggrieved party could
obtain an order permitting the ecclesiastical judge to take up the
case again and the suit would proceed despite the prohibition.
Six of the 52 cases contain some kind of a reference to the procurement of a writ of consultation. The records in three of these
cases demonstrate actual introduction of the writ.52 The records
in the other three merely indicate that one would probably be
sought, as in a case heard at Ely in 1378 in which the court scribe
recorded, "therefore we decree that the [cause] is to be suspended until we can obtain a consultation." 53 These six cases
show, as does the aggregate of the 52, apparent obedience to the
royal writs and a willingness to accept the common law rules
rather than to attack them. To apply for a writ of consultation
was to work within the system of royal law. If it is true, as
suggested above, that writs of prohibition were infrequently introduced, it is not because they were disregarded by the Church
courts.
II.

ECCLESIASTICAL SANCTIONS

The impression of ecclesiastical acquiescence in the claims of
the royal courts conveyed by the Church courts' reactions to royal
prohibitions is not, however, a complete picture. It is not wholly
accurate to say that the prelates were reduced to supplication
of the King for redress of their complaints about lay incursions
on ecclesiastical jurisdiction.5 4 The records of the Church courts'
show that they had weapons of their own in the disputed areas
of jurisdiction. Those weapons, although "purely spiritual" in
character, continued to be useful in the centuries prior to the
fidei lesionis et perjurii inter dominum Hugonem Mavys et ipsum; tamen
ante recessum eius a consistorio concordatum est cum parte et pars rea
est absoluta et dimissa."
51. See Stat. Consultation, 18 Edw. I in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM
108; 1 W. HoLDsworTH, supra note 9, at 229.
52. Canterbury Act book Y.1.13, f. 378v (1483); York C.P. E 141
(1385); York Reg. Bowet I, f. 307r (1411). Another instance, taken from
an actual case, is found in JonN LyDro 'S Boox 69 (D. Owen ed. 1974).
53. Act book EDR D/2/1, f. 86v: "Porrecta est regia prohibitio ideo
decernimus fore suspendendum quousque consultationem poterimus optinere." The other two instances are found in Canterbury Ecclesiastical
Suit Roll, no. 54 (1293) and Act book Y.1.1, f. 40r (1373).
54. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 11, at 239. For the somewhat parallel situation in France, see 0. MARTIN, L'AssEwIaLEE DE VINCENNES DE
1329

ET

SEs CONSEQUENcES 172-74 (1909).
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Reformation. There was, in other words, a positive defense of
ecclesiastical claims to jurisdiction. The defense was not made
by a direct attack on royal prohibitions. No spiritual sanctions
were invoked against the King's government or the justices of
the royal courts. But spiritual sanctions were invoked against
those who used the machinery made available by royal courts.
They were applied against litigants rather than against the
Crown. It is doubtful, admittedly, that the existence of these
sanctions can completely explain the infrequency of prohibited
cases in the Church court records. But at least we are in a better
position to assess the place of the writ in Church-State relations
if we examine them.
It has long been recognized that the canon law contained
penal sanctions against those who used secular power to hinder
the Church from exercising its jurisdiction. Most notably in
England, Archbishop Boniface's Council of Lambeth in 1261
promulgated a series of constitutions against lay encroachment
on spiritual jurisdiction. 55 Not much attention has been paid
to the effect of these measures in practice. It is true that the
Pope, acting at the urgent request of Henry III, refused to confirm them. 56 Moreover, the English canonist William Lyndwood
(d. 1446) later commented that they "were but little observed." '
These facts, together with exclusive reliance on royal court records, have led some modern writers to disregard the penal sanctions.
However, as Professor Cheney has pointed out, the English
constitutions defending the ecclesiastical jurisdiction did not need
papal approval to be valid.58 It is even possible that Lyndwood's remark meant only that the penalties actually used in
practice were taken not from Archbishop Boniface's constitutions, but from the similar statutes of Archbishop John Stratford
(d. 1348)69 and from the law of the entire Western Church found
55. Cou cirs AND SYNODS, supranote 28, at 659-84.
56. Id. at 686. See generally 0. PoNTAL, LEsSTATUTS SYNODAUX
50 (Typologie des Sources du Moyen Age Occidental A-III.1 1975);
Cheney, Legislation of the Medieval English Church (pt. 2) 50 ENG. HisTORIcAL REV. 385, 402-06 (1935); Jones, supra note 13, at 215.
57. W. LYNDwOOD, supra note 6, at 92 s.v. contingit. Maitland went
too far, I believe, in suggesting that these were "useless canons," and
that "the battle had been decided." See F. Maitland, Church, State
and Decretals, in RomAN CAoN LAw iN THE CHURcH oF ENGLAND 61
(1898, reprint 1968).
58. See CouNcms AND SYNODS, supra,note 28, at 662.
59. '2 D. WmxKms, CONCILIA MAGNAE BRITANNIAE AT HIBERNIAE 70209 (1737).
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in the Corpus Juris Canonic. 6 0 The Church court records suggest this possibility. Whenever they contain explicit reference
to the source of the penalty it is to one of Stratford's statutes,
called Accidit novitate perversa,61 or to a canon found in Gratian's Decretum called Si quis suadente.6 2 Lyndwood included
the former in his collection with no qualification on its usage.
Thus, although the constitutions of Archbishop Boniface may not
have been used in practice, their purpose was served by the use
of other similar sanctions. The Church courts were willing to
take positive steps to enforce at least part of the canonical view
of the jurisdictional boundary. Evidence of effectiveness is difficult to assess. But it would not be accurate to treat the disciplinary rules of the Church as a dead letter. The court records
suggest a continuing, sophisticated, and serviceable series of actions available to defend the ecclesiastical position.
The sanctions as enforced in the Church courts can be divided into two classes: first, disciplinary proceedings against
parties who used the machinery of the secular courts, including
writs of prohibition, to impede an ecclesiastical cause or judgment, and second, prosecution of persons who brought suits in
the secular courts which belonged, because of their subject matter, to the Church courts. The surviving records reveal a greater
number of examples of the first practice than of the second. Most
were brought ex officio. That is, the ecclesiastical court itself
prosecuted the suit. They were sometimes brought specifically
under the provincial constitution Accidit novitate perversa referred to above, 3 sometimes under the general rubric of con60. For brief descriptions of the standard corpus of the canon law,
see R. MoRTnMEM, WESTEMN CANON LAw 40-55 (1953); Donahue, supra
note 9, at 648-49, nn. 10-14.
61. E.g., Hereford Act book 1/4, 104 (1510), in which Llewellyn ap
Rees admitted to having caused the arrest of William Watkyns in a secular court because Watkyns had cited him before an ecclesiastical tribunal.
The official of the diocesan court at Hereford then declared officially that
Rees had incurred the "penam constitutionis que sic incipit accidit
novitate perversa." Rees asked to be absolved and swore to obey the
dictates of the canon law. The constitution referred to is given by W.
supra note 7, at 260 and D. WiLKNs, supra note 59, at 707.
62. E.g., Exeter Act book Chanter MS. 776 s.d. 22 June 1518, in

LYNDWOOD,

which William Blakmore was cited, "ad dicendam causam quare non
debeat declarari pro excommunicato pro eo quod inciderit in canonem
si quis suadente etc." He submitted to the court. The canon excommunicated those who "laid violent hands" on a cleric and was therefore
appropriately used only in cases where the complainant was a cleric and
there had been force. It is found in the Decretum Gratiani (C. 17 q.
4 c. 29) 1 CoRPus Juais CANoNIci, supra note 19, at col. 822.
63. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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tempt,64 sometimes without any special designation. 5 All were
aimed at disciplining the party who had made use of the secular
legal process. All were aimed at undoing its effects. For example, at Rochester in 1321, Henry de Elham was cited for having
laid violent hands on a cleric and for having made use of a royal
prohibition in the dispute with him. Elham submitted to the
judgment of the court, swore never to use a prohibition in an
ecclesiastical cause again, and agreed to pay the aggrieved cleric
four marks for the expenses he had incurred in the matter.6 6 In
1443 at York, Cecelia Jaekson appeared before the auditor of the
Dean and Chapter to answer for having "impeded the ecclesiastical jurisdiction by arresting and unduly vexing by the temporal
law" a certain Robert Clyse. Jackson "submitted herself to penance to be awarded and to the grace" of the court. 67 At Canterbury in 1399, Thomas Felton was summoned before the Church
court and charged with interfering with its jurisdiction by using
the secular courts to trouble the vicar of Eastchurch. Felton
confessed and abjured further interference under penalty of 20
6 8
shillings.
It is unfortunate that good statistics cannot be given for the
number of these cases. The incomplete contemporary records of
the Church's ex officio jurisdiction make it impossible to give any
reliable figures. Most entries in the Act books state merely that
a person was disciplined for wrongfully interfering with the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. Such entries sometimes
mean no more than that the person involved had forcibly prevented the court's summons from being delivered. 9 We simply
64. London Deposition book DL/C/206, ff. 171r-173r, called negotium contemptus.
65. E.g., Canterbury Act book Y.1.4, f. 98 (1422) in which John Odle
was cited "super eo quod arrestavit sive arrestari procuravit rectorem
de Hamme pro eo quod ipse rector prosequebatur dictum Johannem in
curia christianitatis." Compare an entry in the same Act book, at f. 93r
(1422), in which John Ashelsted was summoned to show cause why he
should be declared to have incurred "penam illius constitutionis accidit
novitate perversa pro eo quod fecit Thomam Ketyng arrestari." The Act
book does not indicate why reference was made to the constitution in
one instance but not in the other.
66. REGISTRUM HAmoNis Htmm, supra note 24, at 214-15.
67. Act book D/C A B 1, f. 104r. There is a printed example in
W. HAL4 A SERs OF PaRECEENTS AND PROCEEDINGS 3N CRIMINAL CAUSES,
1475-1640, at 32 (1973).
68. Act book Y.1.2, f. 131v.
69. York Act book D/C A B 1, f. 42r (1408), in which the accusation
was that the defendant "insultum fecit Ricardo Lychefeld mandatorio
venerabilis capituli pro eo quod idem Ricardus ipsum dominum Willelmum (the defendant) citavit ipsumque Ricardwm insequebatur cur arco
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do not know, in many cases, if the interference involved the use
of secular legal process. Sometimes we can be sure. Some of
the entries specifically mention that there had been attachment
or arrest by royal officials,7 0 or that a writ of capias or prohibition had been used,' or that chattels claimed in an ecclesiastical
suit had been seized by royal officers.7 2 More often, however,
we cannot tell.
It is also difficult to ascertain the way in which the disciplinary cases came to the attention of the judges in the ecclesiastical courts. Most prosecutions probably depended on a complaint, perhaps no more than an informal notice, given by the
party against whom secular process had been invoked. In form
and in theory the ecclesiastical proceedings were carried out ex
officio, that is, at the suit of the judge.7 3 No private party sued,
but there must have been some way of bringing the matter before the judge. It is natural to think that it was done by one
of the litigants, and that is what the records from the royal
courts suggest. Occasionally the Church court records are full
enough to suggest the same thing, as in a London prosecution
from 1471 in which the case was dismissed when the parties involved reached an agreement.7 4 Most of the records, however,
tenso et sagittis ac ad ipsum sagittavit." William confessed the attack,
but alleged that he had mistaken Richard for someone else.
70. E.g., Hereford Act book Il, 75 (1493): "[P]rocuravit ipsum
attachiari;" Canterbury Act book Y.1.3, L 41v (1417): "[P]rocuravit
dictum rectorem arestari." In the margin beside one such case, found
in Canterbury Act book Y.1.5, f. 65r (1454), is a large hand pointing to
the case. It was drawn by Francis Aldrich, registrar of the court in the
late sixteenth century, evidently to support the post-Reformation court's
claims to authority. I owe the identification of the scribe to Dr. William
Urry, Reader in Paleography at the University of Oxford.
71. Canterbury Act book Chartae Antiquae A 36 IV, f. 90v (1347):
"[I]mpetravit unum breve vocatum capias nomine vicarii;" Rochester,
REGISTRUM HAMONIs HETaE, supra note 24, at 943 (1347): "[I]ncidisse
in sentenciam excommunicationis majoris a jure latam, eo quod quandam regiam prohicitionem ad impediendum jurisdiccionem ecclesiasticam . . . impetrasti."

72. Rochester Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 108r (1439), in which the defendant was cited for causing the seizure of the horse of Richard Frowde
because of a cause under litigation in the consistory court. In Canterbury Sede Vacante Scrapbook H, 71 (1294), the chattels at issue were
alleged to be part of a legacy, and thus subject to the Church's jurisdiction. The defendant was alleged to have "caused them to be distrained
by a lay court."
A LA VEMILE fU
73. See A. LETEBWR-TEmLARD, LEs OFFI0CAL
CONCILE DE TRENTE

79-81 (1973);

8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT

CoivWox LAw § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); B. WOODCOCK, supra
note 12, at 93-102.
74. Act book MS. 9064/1, f. 58v.
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tell us nothing. The source and the factual details behind these
prosecutions are too often obscure. What is clear is their existence. Their use in practice as a means of defending the Church's
view of its jurisdiction is not open to doubt.
The principal remedy available under these ex officio proceedings was to require the person summoned to desist from
impeding the suit pending in the ecclesiastical court. That meant,
in a normal case, stopping the secular law suit. An order,
we may even say an injunction, "not to vex"75 or "not to prosecute" 70 in the secular forum was therefore issued by the ecclesiastical judge. The offending litigant often took an express oath
to obey the injunction or to renounce further use of the secular
courts. 77

In appropriate cases the litigant was also obliged to

pay the expenses incurred by the person injured by the suit in
the royal courts. 78 Or he might have to undergo public penance.
That meant a public whipping, or marching barefoot and dressed
in penitential clothes in the parish procession before high Mass. 79
Assessment of the appropriate penalty lay in the discretion of
the judge, and practice seems to have varied. 0 The essential
element, however, was to force the guilty party, under penalty
75. E.g., Canterbury Act book Y.1.10, f. 314r (1477): "Deinde iudex
monuit dictum Thomam sub pena excommunicacionis quod non vexeret
ipsum in curia temporali."

76. E.g., Norwich Act book ACT/i s.d. 12 November 1509: "Dominus iniunxit Thome Balle de Bettler quod non prosequatur aliquam
accionem in curia seculari contra Gregorium Burnell ... sub pena
excommunicacionis."
77. E.g., Hereford Act book 1/4, 104 (1510): "Et prestitit iuramentum de parendo iuri." See also J. SAYERS, supra note 9, at 255-57; Adams,
supra note 5, at 283 n.43.
78. Canterbury Act book Y.1.1, f. 105r (1375) (one mark expenses);
REGISTRUm HAmoms HETHE, supra note 24, at 215 (four marks, reduced
from the eight claimed).
79. E.g., York Act book D/C A B 1, f. 104r (1443): "Quo sic facto
dominus auditor iniunxit eidem quod tansiet coram processione in ecclesia cathedrali Ebor' per duos dies dominicales nudis tibiis et pedibus
tunicaque sua singulari induta more penitentiali, necnon cotidie in eadam
forma circa ecclesiam parochialem de Cave predicta." This penance was,
however, remitted ex gratia.
80. See, e.g., JOANNES ANDREAE, NOVELLA COMMENTARIA IN LXBROS
DECRETALTUM, lib. 5, tit. de poen. et remis., c. 3 (Significavit) (Venice
1581, f. 123): "Consideratis circunstantiis arbitraria poenitentia imponetur." With the penance mentioned in the text accompanying note 67 supra, compare a case recorded in Canterbury Act book Chartae Antiquae
A 36 II, f. 5r (1329); the offender was obliged to approach the shrine of
St. Thomas of Canterbury six times and make an offering of a candle of
a certain value. See also AN EPIscOPAL COURT BooK FOR THE DIOCESE OF
LINcoLN, 1514-1520, at xv (M. Bowker ed. 61 Lincoln Record Society
1967),
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of major excommunication, to undo the effects of his invocation
of the secular jurisdiction to thwart proceedings in the ecclesiastical court.
The existence of these ecclesiastical sanctions and the use
which the Church court records show was made of them in preReformation England help to explain an apparent inconsistency
in the record evidence. That is the disparity between the way
writs of prohibition were actually treated in the Church courts
and the way one finds them described as being treated in the
plea rolls of the royal courts. No allegation appears more regularly on the plea rolls in cases involving prohibitions than disobedience to the writ.8 ' The canon law judges were said to have
spurned it. They "made light of" the royal writ. They "tore
it up." They "threw it to the ground." They "fulminated" sentences of excommunication against the party introducing the
writ.8 2 The Church court records say just the opposite. They
show that officials of the ecclesiastical courts obeyed writs of
prohibition. This apparent inconsistency may be explained in
some cases by the "two-stage" nature of the ecclesiastical reaction
to the writs; that is, compliance with the writ, coupled with giving the party harmed the opportunity, in a separate hearing, to
seek discipline in personam against the person who sued out the
secular process. In the plea rolls, the two parts were alleged together. The "two-stage" ecclesiastical reaction was treated as
a single transaction. Indeed its ultimate effect was single. If
the evidence of the Church court records is considered in its entirety, the secular plea rolls may give an accurate, picture of the
reality.
The second situation in which the ecclesiastical courts acted
affirmatively to defend their jurisdiction involved prosecutions
brought against litigants who initiated in secular courts suits
which belonged (according to the canonical view) to spiritual ju81. E.g., P.R.O. C.P. 40/346, m. 73 (1346): "[E]t ipsum Ricardum
causa liberacionis brevium predictorum excommunicavit;" C.P. 40/150,
m. 25d (1304): "[Dlictum breve regium postquam iud admiserat a se
contemptabiliter proiecit et illud inspicere vel a prosecutione sua in
placito predicto . .. desistere penitus recusavit in Regis contemptum
manifestum."
82. E.g., P.R.O. C.P. 40/149, m. 195 (1304): "[C]um idem Henricus
breve regium de prohibitionis ex parte domini Regis eidem Rogero porrexit ... idem Rogerus mandatum Regis perinpendens in hac parte
breve illud fregit et dilasteravit et ad terrain proiecit et in ipsum Henricum racione brevis Regis sibi porrecti sentenciam excommnunicationis
sepius fulminavit et nichilominus placitum ilud tenuit in curia Christianitatis,"
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risdiction. The offense alleged was not interference with an existing cause in the Church courts. It was suing in the wrong
court. These prosecutions represent a rough ecclesiastical equivalent of royal writs of prohibition. For example, at Canterbury
in 1456 Thomas Gylnot was summoned before the diocesan court
"because he initiated and prosecuted a certain testamentary cause
which belongs to the ecclesiastical forum in a secular court."8 3
At York a prosecution was brought against a defendant because
he had "impleaded [a cleric] in a secular court about a covenant
breached [concerning] tithes."8 4 In 1342 William Orable was
prosecuted for withholding tithes and also for threatening to sue
85
for the chattels involved in a secular forum.
The result of such a prosecution was basically no different
from that which followed most ex officio prosecutions for using
the secular courts to impede ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In the
1456 case from Canterbury, for instance, Gylnot was ordered
to withdraw the suit from the secular court under pain of excommunication and was directed to pay the other party's expenses.,
Again it is impossible to tell how most of the cases came to the
attention of the ecclesiastical court, except to suppose that many
were initiated by a private complaint. In one case in 1471 the
record specifically noted that the suit was prosecuted at the promotion of the monks of St. Augustine's Abbey, who were prob87
ably originally sued in the secular forum.
It is worth pointing out that these ex officio prosecutions
were far more efficient than royal writs of prohibition. The ef83. Act book Y.1.5, f. 109v: "Thomas Gylnot de parochia de Faversham ad dicendam causam quare puniri et excommunicari non debeat
pro eo quod ipse Thomas Gylnot quandam causam testamentariam et
ecclesiasticam que ad forum ecclesiasticum pertinet in foro seculari agite
et prosequitur."
84. York Act book D/C A B 1, f. 13v (c.1400): "[Ijmplacitavit
dictum dominum Johannem in curia seculari super convencione huiusmodi per ipsum dominum. Johannem violata pro eo quod certas oves ad
decimam quadragesimalem pertinencias . . .in curia seculari predicta
obtinuit et recuperavit."
85. Canterbury Act book Chartae Antiquae A 36 IV, f. 57r: "Willelmus Orable parochianus dicte ecclesie de Cranebrok denegat solvere
decimam silve sue cedue ... asserens se velle fatigare abducentes
huiusmodi decimas in foro seculari." He submitted and swore not to
"fatigare" the vicar and to pay arrearages.
86. Note 83 supra: "Fatetur quod prosequitur et habet ad subtrahendum causam a curia seculari sub pena excommunicationis et satisfaciendum expensis." These expenses were taxed at 2s.
87. Canterbury Act book Y.1.11, f. 123v: "Johannes Pocul de
Chartham notatur quod violavit libertates ecclesiasticas in tantum quod
initiavit accionem spiritualem in temporalem; citat' per Nedam ad promocionem abbatis et conventus sancti Augustini."
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fectiveness of the royal courts was considerably hindered by the
procedure used there. Professor Adams' Article details the difficulties. For example, if the writ prohibited a plea of debt,
whereas the real cause of action involved theft of chattels, a different but equally secular plea, the writ availed nothing.8 8 There
were many other such difficulties.8 9 The ecclesiastical prosecution did not labor under them. It did not require delivery of
a writ correctly describing the prohibited action. Its outcome did
not depend on the vagaries of wager of law or jury trial. Rather,
it was brought under a procedure which allowed the judge to
interrogate the accused under oath to discover what he had done.
If it turned out that the accused had brought a suit belonging
to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the royal courts, he had to withdraw it or suffer excommunication.
Even with these procedural advantages, however, the evidence of the court records suggests that this second sort of ecclesiastical sanction was not used as frequently as the first. There
are fewer cases of ecclesiastical prosecution for bringing a spiritual plea in the secular court than there are prosecutions for using secular process to impede a case pending in the Church
courts. There are more receipts of royal prohibitions recorded
than there are instances of its spiritual counterpart. Those in
which the subject matter is recorded cover only the tithe and
testamentary causes. This suggests that if a litigant chose to
bring a case involving a benefice or contract in the royal court,
the ecclesiastical courts would not excommunicate him for doing
so.90 The Church courts might entertain such actions. They
would not, in practice, interfere if a litigant went to the royal
court instead.9 1 Compared to the immediate problems raised by
88. See Adams, supra note 5, at 283 n.49.
89. Id. at 277-85; Flahiff (pt. 2), supra note 10, at 249-74. But cf.
Milsom, supra note 9, at cc.
90. A preliminary sample of cases on the late medieval royal court
plea rolls also suggests that where any interference by canon law courts
with royal court jurisdiction over advowsons was alleged, the interference was usually alleged to have taken place at the Roman court, not
in England. E.g., P.R.O. K.B. 27/342, Rex m. 29 (1345), in which the
prebend of Hovedon was at issue, and in which it was alleged that James
Multon, "machinans iudicium predictum in curia Regis predicta rite redditum et eius executionem enervare, . . . traxit in placitum extra regnum

Regis Anglie et adhuc trahit in Regis contemptum ac iuris corone Regis
Anglie preiudicium."

See generally HEmwnGBY'S REGISTER 14-36

(H.

Chew ed. 18 Wiltshire Archaeological and Natural History Society, Records Branch 1962).
91. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 57, at 64-65. The position taken
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interference with suits already in ecclesiastical hands, this may
have seemed a lesser problem. It was more theoretical, a matter
of ideology, while interference with pending suits kept justice
from being done. We can say only that there was a possibility
of prosecution of litigants who brought in a secular court cases
thought to belong in the ecclesiastical forum. How effective that
possibility was in deterring litigants from doing so is a matter
of speculation.
III. CONCLUSION
A summary of the evidence taken from the records of the
Church courts relating to conflicts of jurisdiction is easily
made. The canon law did not oppose the commands of royal justice directly. The Church courts obeyed a writ of prohibition
when they received one. They did not excommunicate the King
or his judges for hearing cases which belonged, according to the
canon law, to spiritual jurisdiction. They did not impose interdicts on the lands of the King.9 2 They did, on the other hand,
make available remedies operating in personam against litigants
who used the secular courts to interfere with the exercise of
canonical jurisdiction.
We might analogize the situation to Chancery procedure
where common law and equity conflicted. That is, Chancery
made no attack on the common law rules. The Chancellor would
not attempt to keep the common law judges from enforcing the
restrictive rules of that law. He would, however, enforce a supplementary system which imposed a duty on one who sought to
93
take advantage of a common law rule in order to work injustice.
Something like the same thing happened in the Church courts.
A litigant might make use of the royal courts, but if he did so
to frustrate justice as administered in the ecclesiastical courts,
he could be proceeded against independently. He faced the
added burden of excommunication. The effect of imposing this
by the French Parlement was analogous; see 0. MARTIN, supra note 54,
at 237-40.
92. An interdict was an order suspending participation in the sacraments by all Christians in a given area. It was subject, however, to a
number of special rules and exceptions. See generally Gloss to Clem.
2.2.1, in CoRPus JuRis CANONICI (Rome 1582, cols. 90-91); Jombart, Interdit, in 5 DIcTIONxAmu DE DRorr CANONIQTE, Col. 1464. The interdict was
apparently used, at least occasionally, in France as part of ordinary canonical procedure. See 0. MARTIN, supranote 54, at 243-47.
93. See J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 42
n- T=
(1971); Barton, Equity in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUr

WoRLD's LEGAL SYSTE Ms 139, 150 (R. Newman ed. 1973).
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on the litigant who used the secular courts was to blunt the force
of writs of prohibition and other process of the royal courts.
But a hard question remains. Did the injunctions of the ecclesiastical courts have any force? The Chancery had considerable powers of enforcement behind it. The Church courts had
only excommunication. Was this spiritual weapon effective? Unless it was, the sanctions described above were next to worthless.
The court records supply no trustworthy answer to this hard
question of effectiveness. Many of the entries in the Act books
break off before conclusion of the suit. And even where the accused confessed and submitted to the court, we cannot be sure
that he ultimately obeyed the court's injunctions. Perhaps he
later had recourse to the royal courts to impede enforcement of
the ecclesiastical sentence. There is no way to be certain.
At a distance of several centuries, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to grasp the contemporary attitude towards excommuni94
cation. About its efficacy in medieval England opinions differ.
But there are two clear facts which suggest the utility of the
ecclesiastical sanctions. One is that, even if the excommunicate
did not fear the spiritual loss the sentence entailed, he was subject to a number of secular incapacities because of it. He was
excluded from pleading in secular courts.95 His company was
to be shunned by all Christians.9 6 In England he could be arrested and imprisoned if the bishop "signified" to the King that
he had remained unrepentantly excommunicate for 40 days or
more.9 7 Excommunication was, in short, an unhappy position
from which an ordinary man would seek to be released. The second fact is the real vitality of the Church courts in the late medieval period. Plaintiffs continued to use them to enforce their
claims. The Church courts continued to exercise jurisdiction
even in areas where prohibitions lay. The evidence from the Act
books and several recent studies testify to this vitality.98 This
94. Compare, e.g., Hill, The Theory and Practice of ExcommunicaHISTORY 1 (1957) with Kelly, The Submission of the Clergy, 15 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HISTORIcAL SOCIETY, 5th ser.
97, 108 (1965).
95. H. BRACTON, supra note 3, at f. 426b.
96. See, e.g., HosTIENSIS, SUMMA AuREA, tit. de sent. excom., no. 11
(Venice 1574, col. 1902): "Effectus autem maioris excommunicationis
est, ut nullus Christianus cum tall participet."
97. See generally F. LoGAN, supranote 9.
98. See, e.g., Bowker, Some Archdeacons' Court Books and the
Commons' Supplication against the Ordinaries of 1532, in TE STUDY OF
MEDIEVAL RECORDS 282 (D. Bullough & R. Storey eds. 1971); Donahue,
supra note 9; Helmholz, Canonical Defamation in Medieval England, 15

tion in Medieval England, 42
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must be taken as a sign of the effectiveness of the ecclesiastical
sanctions. There is evidence to the contrary, but the evidence
of the effectiveness of the Church courts should not be easily
or completely disregarded.
In sum, the evidence suggests that the Church courts placed
a real weapon in the hands of litigants whose interests coincided
with the defense of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They were not
helpless. The use made of the weapon must have varied considerably from case to case, according to the resources of the litigants and even according to the sentiment of the community. It
may be that, in practice, customary rights of jurisdiction, dependent on what Professor Arnold has called "shared societal assumptions," had more to do with determining the boundary line between jurisdiction of Church and State than did the apparently
preemptory commands of the writ of prohibition.9" Of course,
it is important to remember that there were many areas of
harmony and cooperation between the two court systems. But
even in terms of actual cases of conflict, writs of prohibition
ought to be viewed as only one weapon used to determine particular disputes. They had a real force in the Church courts.
That is evident. But the testimony of the court records indicates
that the courts Christian had weapons of their own. They show
how much room the resources provided by the two court systems
left for harrassment, bargaining, and compromise.
The conclusions drawn from the record evidence do not diminish the value of Professor Adams' Article. They do supplement it. They fill out our knowledge of how writs of prohibition
were treated in the Church courts themselves. And they suggest
that it would be a mistake to draw too simple a picture of legal
relations between Church and State in medieval England. All
the advantage was not on one side. It is wrong to pretend that
the writ of prohibition alone determined the jurisdictional
boundary. A great deal depended on what use individual litigants chose to make of the resources provided by Church and
King. If the resulting picture is confused, it accurately represents the reality. That the two court systems could have existed
AvI. J. LEGAL HISTORY 255 (1971); Morris, A Consistory Court in the Middle Ages, 14 J. EccLEsIAsTIcAL HISTORY 150 (1973); Schoeck, Canon Law
in England on the Eve of the Reformation, 25 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 125

(1963).

99. See Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of

Sight, out of Mind, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 267, 279 (1974).
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together for so long without greater friction and without reaching a final resolution of the question of jurisdictional competence
is a tribute both to the weakness of all government in the Middie Ages and to the unwillingness on the part of either side to
push theoretical claims to their logical conclusions.

